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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 001396 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS PASS TO EUR/NCE BULGARIA DESK OFFICER MARK TURNER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2032 TAGS: ENRG, PGOV, PREL, BU SUBJECT: SUBJECT: BULGARIA: FACING RESURGENT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON THE EVE OF THE PUTIN VISIT Classified By: Amb. John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Bulgaria is bracing for the January 17-18 visit of the Russian President, fully expecting Putin will bring some deliverables, but many more demandables. Together with a few cultural sweeteners, the Russians will push a hard line on Kosovo; missile defense, CFE, and U.S. temporary deployments under the Defense Cooperation Agreement; and energy, especially South Stream. The Bulgarians are intent on holding their ground on issues affecting NATO and the EU, but are more wobbly on energy, where, despite our concerted work to stiffen their resolve, Russian blandishments and pressure are strongest. Putin,s visit is one aspect of a broader Russian effort to regain some of the political and economic "market share" it lost here over the past ten years. Membership in NATO and the EU allows Bulgaria a stronger basis for resisting Russian pressure, but the instinct to accommodate Moscow is still strong. High-level U.S. engagement can act as a brake on this instinct, and we need to look at some planned visits by Bulgarian leaders to Washington in 2008 as opportunities to help Bulgaria define and defend its transatlantic interests. END SUMMARY SOFT POWER . . . ---------------- 2. (S//NF) During his January 17-18 visit, Putin is primed to sign four agreements: culture; science and technology; nuclear fuel return from Bulgaria,s research reactor (we have a parallel agreement under negotiation); and anti-organized crime cooperation (sic). More important, he will push on key regional and energy topics -- Kosovo, NATO-Russia, and gas and oil projects. The Russians are playing a strong hand. On the "soft side," Bulgarian popular mythology romanticizes Russian intervention in securing Bulgaria's 1880,s independence from Ottoman Turkey. Drawing on shared Slavic bonds of culture, language, and religion, Russia vies with the EU in popularity rankings -- placing in the 60-70 percent range -- whereas the U.S. average is around 55 percent. Moscow will also dole out up to 10 million euros to celebrate the 130th anniversary of liberation as part of the 2008 "Year of Russia" - renovating churches, battle sites, monuments, and promoting broader cultural and educational exchanges. . . . AND HARDBALL REALITIES ---------------------------- 3. (C/NF) On the "hard side," more tangible and powerful forces are at play: massive dependence on Russian energy, Lukoil,s prominence in the economy, legitimate and shady Russian business investments, and Bulgarian politicians, strong personal and business ties with Moscow. The Bulgarians chafe at and resent Russian big brother condescension and increasingly heavy-handed tactics. These are summed up neatly by candid and typically maladroit Russian statements (in Sofia and Brussels) that Bulgaria is Russia's "bridge" into the EU and its "Trojan horse." 4. (C/NF) But there are inescapable realities that keep resentment from hardening into stronger policies. Bulgaria depends on Russia for 98 percent of its oil and 95 percent of its natural gas supplies, according to Bulgargaz officials. Bulgaria gets all its nuclear fuel for its reactors from Russia. Huge energy imports have led to a highly unbalanced foreign trade deficit, which in 2006 represented 46 percent (or 2,992.2 million euros) of Bulgaria's overall trade deficit. Lukoil is Bulgaria's largest single taxpayer, accounting for 25 percent of tax revenues and five percent of GDP. Gazprom, Bulgaria's sole natural gas supplier, has a hand in three major energy projects including the SOFIA 00001396 002 OF 003 Burgas-Alexandropolous Pipeline (BAP), South Stream, and construction of the Belene Nuclear power plant. In 2006, Gazprom/Kremlin pressure forced Bulgaria to renegotiate its gas supply and transit agreement, resulting in steadily increasing domestic prices. Gazprom continues to press to privatize and take over state-owned Bulgargaz. In 2006, Russian AtomstroyExport won the construction of a long-delayed new nuclear power plant at Belene in a controversial, non-transparent process involving then Minister of Economy and Energy Rumen Ovcharov (who later lost his job in a different corruption scandal). Belene's contracted costs have been estimated at 4 billion euro (5.8 billion USD), making it the most expensive single project in Bulgaria. OLD SCHOOL TIES TO MOSCOW ------------------------- 5. (S//NF) Key officials, including President Georgi Parvanov, Interior Minister Petkov, Ovcharov (who is now Budget Committee Chairman in Parliament) have ties to Russia. Parvanov -- who received major contributions from Lukoil in his 2006 re-election bid -- has a good personal relationship with Putin, and has visited Russia eight times since assuming office in 2002. Petkov and Ovcharov both are perceived as pro-Russian with links to Russian business and possibly organized crime. Ovcharov studied in Moscow and has spent much of his career working with Russian energy interests; he is widely suspected of enriching himself through the deals he has concluded with Gazprom. The stakes are huge: if consummated, the major Russian energy deals in Bulgaria would be close to USD 10 billion. Even a one percent rake-off would inject USD 100 million into a weak rule of law environment. The xenophobic Ataka party is widely believed to receive considerable funding from Russian sources. Its daily paper serves as a pro-Moscow mouthpiece, regularly spewing anti-U.S. and anti-EU rants and routinely criticizing the U.S.-Bulgarian joint military bases, Bulgaria's military deployments abroad, and U.S.-Bulgarian cooperation in general. TURNING THE SCREWS ON KOSOVO ---------------------------- 6. (S//NF) Bulgaria supports the Ahtisaari plan and is working actively within the EU to maintain (or forge) an EU consensus on recognition for a coordinated declaration of Kosovo independence, and to act as a bridge between Brussels and Belgrade. Moscow will likely prey upon Bulgaria's fear of Serbia's reaction to recognition and Sofia,s economic ties to Belgrade to press the Bulgarians to delay recognition. The Bulgarian side is negotiating the non-discussion of Kosovo during the Putin visit, with no real hope for success. We expect the predictable Russian hard sell, and the Bulgarians to hold their (uneasy) ground. U.S.-BULGARIAN MILITARY COOPERATION: A SORE SPOT FOR MOSCOW --------------------------------------------- -------------- 7. (S/NF) A Russian embassy official told us the Putin visit will focus on economic issues because the Russians "do not have any political problems with the Bulgarians except for U.S. military bases in Bulgaria." The Russians have publicly railed against U.S.-Bulgarian military cooperation, particularly temporary U.S. training deployments to Bulgaria under the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), and Joint Task Force-East infrastructure in Bulgaria and Romania designed to support this training. Bulgarian support for U.S. missile defense plans in Eastern Europe has also ruffled feathers. Past Russian statements have criticized Bulgaria's hopes to be covered by U.S. or NATO missile defense plans. In general, the Russians see U.S.-Bulgarian military cooperation SOFIA 00001396 003 OF 003 and the joint-training facilities in particular as the "sore spot" in the relationship, rarely missing a chance to mischaracterize the facilities as "U.S. bases" in the media, and repeatedly claming the facilities violate CFE. Here again, we expect the Bulgarians will stand firm, although the Putin visit has clearly slowed the government,s timetable for approving new force deployments we are seeking from them in Iraq and Afghanistan. ENERGY: THE WEAKEST LINK ------------------------ 8. (C//NF) SOUTH STREAM AND NABUCCO: The elephant in the room is energy. The Bulgarians do not want to be hurried into a premature South Stream deal, but also don,t want to be left out as Russia dangles options to other possible transit states. Determined to be an energy hub/corridor and anxious for transit fees, the Bulgarians are susceptible to pressure and blandishments. We have argued against speedy decisions ("creative delay"), and urged Bulgaria to retain international legal and technical counsel. But it now looks almost inevitable that they will sign an IGA on South Stream with Putin. Although likely to be thin on substance, it will be loaded with political symbolism that Russia can exploit. Although Bulgaria formally supports the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline, a South Stream IGA (on the heels of the one with Greece) will serve Russian interest in further undermining Nabucco. Privately, the Bulgarians express doubt about the seriousness of the EU and its multiple potential investors to support Nabucco. The Bulgarians do not trust the Russians, but also have few direct dealings with, and little confidence in, the Azeris on alternate guaranteed supplies. The Russians play this grand-master-level energy chess match many moves in advance. The Bulgarians are simply outclassed if they do not slow the clock. FINAL COMMENT ------------- 9. (S//NF) As a NATO and EU member, Bulgaria has greater strengths than ever to resist pressure from a recrudescent Russia. But the old habit to duck when Russia stamps it foot is almost an instinct here. As much as Bulgarians bristle privately at Russian power plays, they see themselves as vulnerable and hesitate to antagonize Moscow. But there are some important exceptions to this rule. Prime Minister Stanishev, despite strong family ties to the USSR, has been willing to stand up to Russia/Gazprom in energy negotiations to protect Bulgaria's interests, and sees nothing good in the backward drift of Russian democracy. Foreign Minister Kalfin repeatedly cites Bulgaria,s NATO and EU membership as a strong strategic reality when discussing relations with Moscow. But the sheer weight of Russian economic interests will sustain Moscow,s influence on business and politics here, no matter what Putin accomplishes during his visit, and no matter how well Bulgarian leaders play the board. Our strongest lever of influence is Bulgarian recognition that a good relationship with the U.S is crucial to their ability to protect their interests. Upcoming visits to the U.S. by FM Kalfin (to meet Secretary Rice in January) and Prime Minister Stanishev (who is seeking a visit in the spring of 2008) will provide low-cost, high-impact opportunities to demonstrate our support for some the strongest proponents of the trans-atlantic view, and also to help them define how to better leverage their strengths against Russian pressure. END COMMENT. Beyrle
