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id: 186801 date: 1/13/2009 8:13 refid: 09BELGRADE34 origin: Embassy Belgrade classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 08BELGRADE1189|08BELGRADE1234|08SARAJEVO1728|08SARAJEVO1913 header: VZCZCXRO5332 RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBW #0034/01 0130813 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 130813Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0861 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000034 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BK, SR SUBJECT: SERBIA NOT FANNING INSTABILITY IN BOSNIA REF: A. 08 SARAJEVO 1913 B. 08 SARAJEVO 1728 C. 08 BELGRADE 1234 D. 08 BELGRADE 1189 Classified By: Deborah Mennuti, Political Chief; reasons 1.4 (b, d). 1. (U) This cable was drafted jointly by Embassies Belgrade and Sarajevo. Summary ------- 2. (C) Despite close relations between Belgrade and Banja Luka, in recent months President Boris Tadic has been publicly taking a strong stand to encourage all parties to respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and uphold the Dayton Agreement. When it comes to engagement, however, Serbia has focused more on its relationship with the entity of Republika Srpska (RS) than on engaging with or supporting state-level institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbias special relations with the RS and inflammatory rhetoric from Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Silajdzic will keep Serbia wary of state-level Bosnian leadership, but Belgrade will continue to be a responsible neighbor as along as it sees the preservation of Dayton as necessary for regional stability and EU membership. End Summary. Tadic Publicly Backs Territorial Integrity of BiH --------------------------------------------- ---- 3. (SBU) The December 10 visit of High Representative Miroslav Lajcak to Belgrade showcased the most recent attempts by President Tadic to underscore his governments opposition to Republika Srpska secession and uphold the Dayton Agreement. A statement from Tadics office announced Serbias undiminished support for the territorial integrity of BiH, supported a principled approach to constitutional reform based on consensus of all three parties, and called for EU membership for BiH. This statement repeated Tadics comments in early November, in which he stressed that cooperation between Serbia and Republika Srpska should not be construed as jeopardizing the integrity of BiH, and called on all Bosnian officials to consistently implement the Dayton Agreement as a guarantee of stability. 4. (C) Tadics comments mark a significant contrast from a year ago when Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica was RS Premier Milorad Dodik,s most reliable Serbian supporter. Speaking privately to us on December 10, Lajcak said that while Dodik and Tadic maintained a close personal friendship, Kostunica was a more reliable source of unconditional political support to the RS. Lajcak had asked various European capitals to press Tadic to contain Dodik, and Tadic had accepted the message. According to recent intelligence reports, Lajcak said, Dodik returned from his November visits to Belgrade disappointed with the lack of support Tadic was willing to offer. An upbeat Lajcak was reassured by Tadics promise to be a stabilizing force in the region and welcomed the news that Foreign Minister Jeremic would be sent to Sarajevo and Banja Luka before the end of the year to repeat Tadics statements supporting Bosnias territorial integrity and constitutional reform through consensus. (Jeremic visited Sarajevo and Banja Luka on December 25-26 (Ref A).) Lajcak also argued that the real problem was Silajdzic, but that Dodik makes things worse because he cannot shut up and instead responds to every Silajdzic provocation. Limited Contact with State-Level Institutions --------------------------------------------- - 5. (SBU) Despite Tadics comments supporting Dayton, Belgrade could do more to develop ties with state-level institutions in Sarajevo rather than pursuing lopsided engagement with Republika Srpska at the expense of state institutions. Our Serbian interlocutors frequently point to good relations with the RS and tepid but improving ties with the Federation, seemingly ignoring that their natural counterparts should be neither entity but the state-level institutions in Sarajevo. One exception is bilateral cooperation on refugee issues, in which Belgrades Commissariat for Refugees works closely with the Bosnian Ministry for Refugees to implement the 2005 Sarajevo Declaration on resettlement of refugees. Both sides frequently share data and have cooperated without major complaint. (There are currently 27,000 Serbian refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina.) BELGRADE 00000034 002 OF 004 Emphasis on Entity-Level Contact -------------------------------- 6. (SBU) Although Bosnias state-level ministries have some necessary contacts with Serbias, the fact that Belgrade has continued to develop close ties with the RS via the 2006 bilateral Framework for Special Parallel Relations between Serbia and the Republika Srpska may help the RS undermine Bosnias state institutions legitimate efforts to exclusively exercise state-level competencies --not least foreign policy. Since formal ratification of the agreement last year, a joint Council on Cooperation has met twice and included prime ministers and presidents of both Serbia and the RS to discuss areas of cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural, tourist, and social realms. On the occasion of the Councils second meeting in November, Tadic publicly noted that the agreement had led to successful joint projects in the fields of energy, education, health care, infrastructure, and dual citizenship. Serbian MFA Neighboring Countries Directorate officer Vladimir Odavic told us in mid-November that the Parallel Relations framework was largely restricted to providing cultural support from Belgrade to the RS because Banja Lukas economic successes had largely rendered moot the need to provide extensive economic assistance. Both the RS and Serbian economies would severely suffer if Dayton unraveled, Odavic added. 7. (SBU) Citing the special parallel relations framework, the Serbian government in November permitted the opening of an RS representative office in Belgrade, officially titled The Agency for the Advancement of Economic, Scientific, Technical, Cultural, and Sports Cooperation with the Republic of Serbia. (The RS has similar representative offices in Brussels and Podgorica.) Tadic, RS President Kuzmanovac, Dodik, and Serbian PM Cvetkovic attended the November 7 opening ceremony in Belgrade. Headed by former PKB bank director Mladjen Cicovic, the RS Representative office in Belgrade consists of four experts who broker contacts between RS and Serbian organizations in areas of economic, cultural, scientific, and sports. Cicovic emphatically told us in December that his office provided only technical assistance and sought to downplay his knowledge of RS political matters by stating that he was apolitical and unaware of dealings between Dodik and the Serbian government. Cicovic was willing to comment, however, that while the administrative system created by Dayton was fraught with inefficiencies, Serbs had to realize that it was the system in which they had to live and that there will always be a border between the RS and Serbia. 8. (C) The Serbian government also sees cultivating ties with the Federation, Bosnias other entity, as desirable but has not launched similar efforts to promote cooperation with state-level entities. Tadic in November said that Serbia was starting an initiative to develop ties with the Federation similar to the special parallel relations framework that existed with the RS, though Federation Vice President Mirsad Kebo denied the Federation sought such an arrangement following Jeremics December visit to Sarajevo (Ref A). Odavic said that he expected an agreement on cultural cooperation to be signed between Serbia and the Federation in spring 2009 that would demonstrate an improved atmosphere of cooperation between Belgrade and Sarajevo. In both cases, there was no mention of fostering greater state-to-state contacts. Accordingly to our diplomatic contacts, Jeremic likes to mention on trips to BiH that he is half-Bosniak, and seems to have a personal interest, stemming from his family background, to improve bilateral ties. Pampering Dodik, Excoriating Silajdzic -------------------------------------- 9. (C) Belgrades focus on cultivating entity-level ties will impede the development of constructive, state-level relations with Sarajevo. Our diplomatic contacts indicate that close relations between Tadic and Dodik have sidelined the Bosnian Embassy and led to the impression that Tadic is conferring de facto recognition of RS independence. Our Bosnian Embassy contacts have complained that Tadic and Dodik have appeared in public events in Belgrade as equals *- such as at the opening of the Republika Srpska Park in New Belgrade on April 30 -- and that Belgrade has sent ministers to visit Banja Luka without informing Sarajevo. Dodik travels frequently to Belgrade without informing the Bosnian Embassy or using the embassys services, according to the Bosnian Embassy, which was not invited to participate in the opening of the RS Representative office in November. Serbian MFA officials have claimed that such treatment is only due to the difficulty of coordinating with Sarajevo, but it continues to BELGRADE 00000034 003 OF 004 be a constant point of grievance. 10. (C) Serbian officials cite the continued inflammatory rhetoric by Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic as an excuse to continue special ties with the RS. Each of our interlocutors mentioned Silajdzic as the key obstacle to strengthening ties with the Federation and state-level institutions. MOD State Secretary and Tadic confidante Dusan Spasojevic told visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary Stuart Jones in November that he considered Silajdzic to be similar to Hague-indicted war criminal and Serbian Radical Party president Vojislav Seselj, because both employed a backward-looking political framework. Odavic said that Silajdzic had intentionally sought to impede Belgrades overtures to Sarajevo and that his efforts since 2006 to erode Serbian identity in the RS had increased the Serbian sense of insecurity in the RS. Dodik skillfully exploited Silajdzics comments for political gain and continues to push back when he sees the RS has no international allies to condemn Silajdzics rhetoric, Odavic said. Belgrade did not consider recent statements by Silajdzic to be representative of the authorities in Sarajevo, Odavic continued, saying that the Odzuk Agreement (Ref B) showed that all entities could constructively work together with Silajdzic out of the picture. Lingering Issues: Border and Yugoslav Property Disputes --------------------------------------------- -- 11. (C) A lack of engagement between Belgrade and Sarajevo has precluded the resolution of ongoing border disputes and the distribution of Yugoslav state property. Bosnian Charge Amira Arifovic told us on December 30 that border negotiations had reached a stalemate due to a lack of high-level political will on both sides. Arifovic described the Serbian position as seeking to exchange territory before signing an agreement while the Bosnian side believes a signed statement is a prerequisite to an exchange. She estimated that the situation could not be resolved without high-level pressure from political leadership on both sides. 12. (C) Arifovic noted Yugoslavia state property restitution as the second key sticking point in the bilateral relationship. The absence of efforts on both sides since 2006 to define and renegotiate details in the Agreement on Succession Issues forestalled progress on restitution. She added that the stalemate was exacerbated by Serbian efforts to effectively seize control of socially-owned Bosnian property in Serbia through claiming authority under Annex G of the Agreement, most recently in December 2008. She lamented the absence of property rights protections for Yugoslav-registered Bosnian property and mentioned Unix Genex, BNT, Unis Promex, Zrak, and Bosnalink as among the most significant Bosnian companies still in Serbia. These companies, and others, as of December were involved in roughly 20 property rights cases in Serbian courts. How Strongly Will Tadic Support Dayton? --------------------------------------- 13. (C) Tadics recent combative comments toward Croatia (Ref C) indicate that he is not immune to playing the nationalist card when politically expedient. However, most observers agree that he is unlikely to support RS secession through the next year for several reasons. First, economic difficulties at home ) exacerbated by the financial crisis - will constrict opportunities for offering economic support abroad. Second, Tadic is boxed in by his position on Kosovo: recognition of RS secession would give the appearance of de facto legitimacy to Kosovo independence, an outcome Tadic cannot accept. Finally, Tadic has very little political advantage to gain at home for supporting Dodik as the treatment of Serbs in any part of Bosnia is not the hot-button issue it is with regard to Croatia, Kosovo, or even Montenegro. Even ex-Radical leadership of the Serbian Progressive Party has denounced efforts to separate the RS from BiH (Ref D). Accordingly, Tadic is likely to hold the line in support of Dayton unless a rapid deterioration in living conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina that severely disadvantages Serbs is coupled with signals from Brussels that Serbias EU prospects are significantly dimmed. Comment ------- 14. (C) Serbias policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina is strongly colored by its European aspirations and fears of regional instability that could hurt Serbian interests. Calculating that RS secession would lead to instability and BELGRADE 00000034 004 OF 004 negative economic consequences, Tadic is prepared to use personal and diplomatic leverage to contain Dodik, up to a point. Belgrades perspective that the real problem is Silajdzic, a point reiterated by Lajcak, makes no secret of where their sympathies lie, but the fact of the matter is that Dodiks statements and actions over the last two years have undermined the state more than the most egregious statements made by Silajdzic. Regardless, Belgrades continued cultivation of entity-level ties impedes the development of constructive relations with state-level institutions, which in turn prevents the resolution of lingering bilateral disputes. Tadics policy represents an important improvement over that of Kostunica, but institutionally Serbia is trying to have it both ways: supporting Dayton and Bosnias territorial integrity while lending credibility, even if indirectly, to Dodiks dangerous rhetoric. Belgrades response to Bosnian requests to restart the BiH-Serbia Inter-State Cooperation Council (which has not met since 2005) will demonstrate the degree to which Belgrade is willing to exercise the regional leadership it claims to be seeking and move toward resolving more complicated bilateral irritants involving borders and property. MUNTER
