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date: 2/3/2010 16:43 refid: 10ATHENS77 origin: Embassy Athens classification: SECRET destination: header: VZCZCXRO5401 OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL DE RUEHTH #0077/01 0341643 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O R 031643Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1471 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC ----------------- header ends ---------------- S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000077 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, GR, MK, TU, CY, IR SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TO DROUTSAS: SHOW WASHINGTON YOUR STUFF CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 1. (S) SUMMARY. In a January 30 meeting with Alternate Foreign Minister Dimitri Droutsas just prior to his first trip to the U.S., Ambassador Speckhard focused him on resolving challenges close to home and advised him to show Washington he was not just a diplomat but a political decision maker with whom we could work. He told Droutsas frankly that bold moves to tackle longstanding regional problems could strengthen the case for a meeting between PM Papandreou and President Obama, given the long queue of leaders seeking to travel to Washington. On Macedonia, he counseled Droutsas to prepare to discuss specifics with Washington counterparts; on Cyprus, he urged him to identify how Greece can help promote a solution in the interest of all and to be more positive in public; on Turkey, he discussed PM Papandreou's recent letter to Turkish PM Erdogan, and Greek views on the future of the relationship, including willingness to take the continental shelf dispute to the ICJ. Droutsas emphasized that he hoped Washington had taken note of the positive direction of Greek-Turkish relations, and Papandreou's personal efforts thus far. He was disappointed in Talat's recent proposal which he characterized as a step backwards in the Cyprus process. Describing Papandreou's approach toward both Turkey and Macedonia, he explained that he is trying to lay the groundwork and build the personal ties necessary to change relationships that have become entrenched in bitter disputes. Turkey is Greece's top foreign policy priority at present, and while Greece's message to Macedonia prior to the December EU Council meeting was "we're ready if you are," Greece did not sense a real effort by Macedonia to find a solution. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- ---------------------- ----------- SHOW WASHINGTON YOU'RE READY TO WORK TOGETHER --------------------------------------------- ---------------------- ----------- 2. (S) The Ambassador met with Alt/FM Droutsas in advance of his February 2 meetings in Washington with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. While delivering a strong message that we welcomed PM Papandreou's interest in strengthening our partnership and playing a greater role in meeting international challenges, he counseled that the most important contribution Greece could make would be to resolve some of the challenges close to home. Show Washington you are a political decision maker able to lead, and somebody with whom we can work together practically to solve problems, the Ambassador said, not just a diplomat who can explain positions. The Ambassador stated that there are many supporters at State and the White House recommending a PM visit to Washington, but given the long queue of leaders wanting to come there were some others asking "why Greece, why now." Bold moves in tackling longstanding regional problems would make the case for a visit even stronger. Droutsas, describing Papandreou's approach toward both Turkey and Macedonia, explained that the PM is trying to build the personal ties and lay the groundwork necessary to overcome the bitter disputes that have become entrenched over the past two decades. Even though these issues may seem inconsequential to Washington in the face of greater world challenges, Droutsas noted, the PM has been working hard to make progress and deserves a great deal of credit for only four months in office. ----------------------- Macedonia Name ----------------------- ATHENS 00000077 002 OF 003 4. (S) The Ambassador told Droutsas that Washington was interested in substance, and that the Deputy Secretary was prepared to talk specifics about what Greece was willing to accept. The U.S. had been listening, the Ambassador said, and believed the main elements of the deal were a geographic qualifier, a general acceptance of erga omnes in the international context, and leaving identity outside the agreement (and not to be recalled at some point in the EU accession process). 5. (C) Droutsas complimented his previous meetings with Macedonian FM Milososki as friendly and warm, and said that he had invited Milososki to Athens following their most recent talks. Droutsas pledged his full support to the UN process, and highlighted his invitation to UN negotiator Nimetz to visit Athens. Looking back at the December 2009 EU Council meeting that punted the decision on naming a date for Macedonian EU accession talks, Droutsas shared his impression that PM Gruevski had believed mistakenly that last-minute pressure within the EU from select states would cause Greece to fold. Greece's message to Macedonia prior to the meeting had been "we are ready if you are," but Athens had seen no real effort by Skopje to work on details. Droutsas stated that if he had one message to pass to Skopje, it would be to avoid public statements that harm the bilateral atmosphere, and create a hostile press climate in Greece that limits the government's course of action. --------- Cyprus --------- 6. (S) The Ambassador told Droutsas to expect Washington to press him on Cyprus and encouraged him not to respond by blaming everything on Turkey, and offer what Greece could do to promote a solution in the interest of everyone. The Ambassador encouraged Greece to be more positive in public in order to help generate the necessary public support for the difficult negotiations. Droutsas believed that the last proposal by Turkish Cypriot leader Talat was seriously disruptive to the process and had been a setback. With these types of "antics" it would be hard to get the progress needed, he said. He agreed that the public dynamics were not helpful, in particular that some Greek Cypriots have started to accept the idea of a permanent partition as preferable to what they thought would be a poor agreement. President Christofias had Greece's full support, Droutsas underscored, and deserved much credit for keeping the process moving in the face of such difficulties. Droutsas conveyed the Greek impression that the talks were not going near as well as reported. He said that he had told this to UN SYG Ban prior to Ban's recent trip to Cyprus, while also assuring him that Greece fully supported the UN process and welcomed the Secretary General's involvement and would support any initiative the SYG undertook. --------- Turkey --------- 7. (C) Greek-Turkish relations are at the top of PM Papandreou's priority list, Droutsas told the Ambassador. He pointed to intensive engagement that began with the PM's October 8, 2009 trip to Istanbul - 4 days after his election - where he met with PM Erdogan, and continued with the exchange of detailed letters by ATHENS 00000077 003 OF 003 both Prime Ministers on bilateral relations, and commitments for future high-level travel to capitals. Droutsas pointed to his 3.5-hour dinner with Turkish FM Davutoglu in London on the margins of the London Conference as a sign of their warm relationship and seriousness of purpose, and said that he had reiterated PM Papandreou's invitation to PM Erdogan to visit Athens, which he anticipates will happen by the end of June. He also informed the Ambassador that Davutoglu invited him to Ankara, which he intends to follow up on in the future. 8. (C) The challenge, Droutsas noted, was how to proceed in practical terms, now that the political willingness appears to be in place. Greece hopes to replicate some successful processes from the 1999-2004 Papandreou-Cem rapprochement to take joint steps on issues of mutual concern such as climate change, the Middle East, and Iran, while continuing high-level consultations on more sensitive areas of the relationship. Greece supports exploratory bilateral talks aimed at delimiting the continental shelf in the Aegean. These talks should proceed with a set timetable, and if a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached by a specific date, they should agree to take jointly the issue of continental shelf delineation to the International Court of Justice for resolution. 9. (C) Droutsas was pleased that thus far, coverage by the Greek media of Papandreou's initiatives has been relatively positive. He attributed this to the methodical, step-by-step approach by Papandreou to the problem, and judged that changing public opinion was a key ingredient in the future success of any initiatives between Greece and Turkey. ------------------------------ Foreign Policy Priorities ------------------------------ 10. (C) Droutsas was clear: the PM had placed changing Greek-Turkish relations at the top of the foreign policy priority list. He assured that this did not mean that Greece was not working hard to resolve the Macedonia name issue - one had only to note the number of Prime Ministerial and Ministerial-level engagements to see the effort - but he hoped Washington would recognize the bold steps the PM was taking on Turkey and realize the significance of this initiative. The PM was going to great lengths to fundamentally and permanently improve the relationship. They were picking up where Papandreou and Cem had left off in 2004 and had been energetic in pushing the process forward in only a few months in office. With the opposition New Democracy party now reorganized following its October defeat and its leader Samaras likely to look toward foreign policy as an area to criticize the government, they were expecting more challenges ahead. Managing Greek domestic politics while moving the foreign policy ball forward was understandably a key component of success. This will be a delicate process with some political risk, and Droutsas asked for Washington's support and understanding. Speckhard
