C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 001162 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2016 TAGS: ENRG, ECON, EPET, PREL, BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA SPARRING AGAINST RUSSIAN ENERGY DEPENDENCE REF: A. SOFIA 632 B. SOFIA 310 C. SOFIA 202 D. SOFIA 190 Classified By: CDA Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY/ACTION REQUEST: Bulgarian leaders are battling against the grip that Russia increasingly holds over the energy sector here, but are struggling to strengthen their position. President Purvanov and Prime Minister Stanishev appear especially concerned; Minister of Economy and Energy Ovcharov less so, perhaps due to his long history of working with the Russian energy sector. None sees any advantage in confronting Russia directly; all have strong interests in maintaining good relations with Moscow. The Russian energy web extends to gas, oil-pipeline construction and the bidding to build a nuclear power plant at Belene. Bulgarian officials are increasingly willing to stand up to Russian pressure and they are open to alternative mechanisms for meeting their energy needs, particularly if they involve the EU and/or U.S. ACTION REQUEST: We strongly recommend a September visit by DAS Matt Bryza to buck up the Bulgarians and shape their strategic vision on energy diversity. We encourage visits by other speakers or experts to buttress USG energy policies. END SUMMARY GAS: FORCED BY RUSSIA TO STRIKE A DEAL 2. (C) Some sobering statistics: Bulgaria gets 88 percent of its gas and 73 percent of its oil from Russia. The government wants to loosen Russia's grip especially on Russian gas. It fears its only option may be to agree to current Gazprom demands to increase the price on gas contracts. Without such an agreement, the Bulgarians fear they will lose an opportunity to lock in prices - and future transit fees - at currently advantageous levels, and are afraid the Russians will follow through on threats to divert transit gas to Blue Stream. The current high energy prices fuel concerns here that now is the time to make a deal. 3. (C) Ovcharov and Gazprom's Medvedev plan to meet in Vienna on August 21 under the guise of "vacations" to try to finalize a deal. Ovcharov told Ambassador Beyrle on August 9 that he was not sure if they could come to a final agreement. He also said the Russians have agreed to a phased-in period of price increases over five to six years, and an increase in transit fees. Aside from the price, outstanding questions include the quantity of gas to flow through Bulgaria to third countries after 2010, and when to announce the increases: either this summer when heating prices are not as sensitive an issue, but which would come a few months before the October 22 presidential election; or in late fall after the election, but when the weather is cold and consumers are already burdened with heating costs. Ovcharov also stressed that Gazprom is pushing for a long-term agreement - possibly 20 years. In addition, Gazprom has indicated it would grant more favorable financial terms in return for a stake in Bulgargaz' pipeline, something Ovcharov has said Bulgaria will not agree to. 4. (C) On the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector (TGI), Ovcharov offered that Bulgaria is interested in the project and would try to hook up the relatively short 70-75 KM distance from the Greek portion. He said Bulgaria has not discussed this with Greece, but has talked with Turkey. As for the origin of the gas, Ovcharov said the Kazakh PM told him that Russia and Iran are working together to block a Trans-Caspian pipeline, citing an old agreement that nothing can be built on the Caspian without the agreement of all parties. Ovcharov has spoken publicly about the threat of Russian gas interests to Europe, and the need for European countries to be part of a common energy policy. But he has also said recently that Bulgaria must take care of its own problems, which requires it to negotiate with Kazakhstan, Turkey, Egypt and Algeria for long-term solutions, as well as Gazprom immediately. B-A PIPELINE: CAT AND MOUSE WITH THE RUSSIANS 5. (C) Ovcharov told us not to expect activity soon on the SOFIA 00001162 002 OF 003 Burgas-Alexandropoulous (B-A) oil pipeline. The Russians are analyzing the financial aspects of the project, preparing feasibility studies, and are again pushing Bulgaria and Greece for 90 percent Russian ownership, leaving 5 percent each for the host countries. Bulgaria wants to step up and build the pipeline, Ovcharov told us, but not at all costs, and not for only a 5 percent share. Bulgaria sees its interests as strategic, and calculates that its participation in the pipeline could give a bit more leverage in gas and nuclear plant talks. 6. (C) Ovcharov also said that Bulgaria and Greece will float the idea of constructing the pipeline without Russian participation. Ovcharov recognizes that it will be nearly impossible to get financial backing without the promise of a Russian supply, but the GOB feels it is worth exploring - particularly in order to push Russia back off its recent grab for 90% control of B-A. Bulgaria also holds out some hope that Chevron might be interested in the project. On Caspian Pipeline Company (CPC), Ovcharov told us he met recently with the Russian Minister of Energy who said Russian interest in CPC is to expand output, not to change the ownership model. BELENE NUCLEAR PLANT: RUSSIAN OFFER IS LEADING 7. (C) The GOB closed the Belene bid review process on July 22. Even before seeing the final recommendations from the National Electric Company, which, along with U.S. company Parsons Engineering is coordinating the bid process, Ovcharov requested the two bidders provide better prices and faster timetables. Ovcharov is particularly interested in new prices from the Russian bidder, Atomstroyexport, and their sub-contractor for the Instrumentation and Control (I and C), Framatom, whose numbers are more than twice Westinghouse's offer for the I and C portion of the Skoda bid. Ovcharov is confident he will get acceptable prices, but has threatened to reconsider the viability of the project if not. When Ambassador Beyrle described the strengths of the Westinghouse proposal, along with its successful experience on the Kozloduy nuclear plants here, Ovcharov agreed, but mentioned "Framaton/Arveal and the EU" with a resigned shrug. Ovcharov also stressed that Bulgaria was not negotiating with Gazprom on the Belene deal. 8. (C) Ovcharov has pointed to the technical superiority of the Atomstroyexport proposal, calling it "cutting edge," such as the one Russia is building in China. He described the Czech offer as fine, but asked why Bulgaria should settle for 20-year old technology. It is unclear, however, whether the GOB would allow a "mix-and-match" by switching Westinghouse in as the I and C portion of the plant. The real risk in this situation is if Gazprom bank or another Russian energy player were to become a major financial stakeholder in Belene - something that the GOB currently says will not happen. The GOB hopes to begin final negotiations with the winning bidder in early September. THE HIDDEN INTERESTS 9. (C) Gas supplies, the B-A pipeline and construction of Belene are intertwined. Russian interests, most pointing back to Gazprom, are involved in the three major energy projects, and Gazprom has also expressed a desire to obtain the Bulgargaz distribution grid if that were to be privatized. Ovcharov has denied that there is any linkage between the projects, but most observers find that hard to believe. In addition, rumors are rampant that organized crime figures, Bulgarian and Russian, are involved with high-level GOB officials in bid-rigging, shakedowns and other illegal behavior in the energy sector (septel to follow.) Ovcharov, who studied in Moscow and has spent much of his professional career working with Russian energy interests, took pains to describe to us measures he is taking to limit the activities of such players. His protestations are at least in part self-serving given the murky world behind the closed doors of a non-transparent negotiation process. COMMENT 10. (C) While Bulgaria is a small player in Europe's energy market, its role as a possible hub or transit country for SOFIA 00001162 003 OF 003 Eastern gas and oil is potentially large. The increasing hunger of Gazprom and other Russian interests to play a larger role in almost all aspects of the Bulgarian market makes it very difficult for Bulgaria to isolate the Russian pieces in this Rubik's Cube. 11. (C) We regularly stress to the President, Prime Minster and Minister of Energy the need for Bulgaria to diversify energy sources away from Russia. They agree, but are at pains to figure out how. Without a coordinated and serious European effort to address what appears to be a comprehensive strategy of Russia and/or Gazprom to reassert its interest in the region, small countries such as Bulgaria may never be able to escape the Russian energy orbit. We strongly recommend a September visit by DAS Bryza to offer our strategic vision and energy outlook to help stiffen Bulgaria's resolve in the face of unrelenting Russian pressure. KARAGIANNIS
[06SOFIA1162] BULGARIA SPARRING AGAINST RUSSIAN ENERGY DEPENDENCE
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