Published by Wikileaks & Bivol.bg
date: 7/10/2009 13:50 refid: 09SKOPJE332 origin: Embassy Skopje classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 09SKOPJE300 header: VZCZCXRO4239 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHSQ #0332/01 1911350 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 101350Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8382 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0539 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SKOPJE 000332 SIPDIS STATE ALSO FOR INR/B E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MK SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: DANGEROUS DRIFT? REF: SKOPJE 300 Classified By: CDA Tom Navratil for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). Summary ------- 1. (C) PM Gruevski's government continues a very mixed performance. He and his closest cronies continue to engage in highly questionable practices on government tenders and in squeezing EVN, the Austrian-owned electricity distributor. Substantial judicial reform lags, but Gruevski has directed the Justice Ministry to take several steps to provide greater transparency and adherence to European standards (reftel). The EU will almost certainly grant Macedonia visa liberalization starting next year, with a good possibility of recommending a start date for accession talks in their annual report this autumn. The June 30 resignation of DPM for Euro-integration Bocevski underscored Macedonia's sluggish forward progress, but also prompted Gruevski to do some cabinet-cleaning. Gruevski may be seeking to distract the public from focusing on the poor performance of his own government and the economy, where the downturn is likely to grow more severe, exacerbating societal tensions. Interethnic and intra-Albanian relations continue to fray as well. However, VMRO and DUI have recently engaged in more practical power-sharing, as seen in DUI,s visible participation in the name talks, agreement to take their equitable representation/patronage concerns into account in the revised police law, and allowing DUI to take over management of the State University of Tetovo. We perceive a greater willingness on Gruevski,s part to tackle the "name issue," but he continues to insist on a referendum to avoid personal responsibility for a historic compromise. End summary. Bocevski Rocks the Boat ----------------------- 2. (C) The sudden June 30 resignation of Deputy Prime Minister for Euro-integration Ivica Bocevski has touched off a storm of political rumors and public accusations, with some observers even questioning whether PM Gruevski -- though he holds nearly all the instruments of political power -- is still in control. United for Macedonia leader (and former VMRO Interior Minister) Ljube Boskoski called for Gruevski to resign over the weekend, citing the GoM's failures in achieving Euro-Atlantic integration and managing the economy, which continues to falter. Nervous GoM ministers and VMRO insiders have hinted privately to us of dissent within the party (over which Gruevski is normally reputed to have an iron grip) over these issues and allegations that Gruevski cousin (and intel chief) Saso Mijalkov is implicated in a corruption scandal surrounding the purchase of double-decker buses made in China. 3. (C) For his part, Bocevski told the Ambassador that as DPM he never got Gruevski's backing to make the real reforms necessary to meet key EU benchmarks, adding that he believes Gruevski may never have wanted real reform in key areas such as an independent judiciary. When he felt he could make no more progress, Bocevski said, he had no choice but to resign. Bocevski senior aide Pero Dimsoski -- a U.S. citizen who returned to Macedonia to take this position -- told the Ambassador that Gruevski and Gruevski's chief of staff, Martin Protoger, pressured him after Dimsoski told the press that Gruevski must take more responsibility for Macedonia's Euro-integration. Ministers Shuffle, but Real Changes? ------------------------------------ 4. (C) As Protoger told us July 6, Gruevski took the opportunity of Bocevski's departure to do some housecleaning in his cabinet. The PM called the Charge July 8 to run through the changes. DPM for the Economy Zoran Stavreski will move over to replace Trajko Slaveski as Finance Minister (but retains his DPM rank), and Vladimir Pesevski will replace Stavreski as DPM for the Economy. Ljupco Dimovski replaces Aco Spasenovski as Agriculture Minister, and Nikola Todorov takes over from Pero Stojanovski as Education Minister. Gruevski also confirmed that he will name Vasko Naumovski to replace Bocevski as DPM for Euro-integration, as the press has been reporting for several days. Brief bios paras. 14-17. 5. (C) Gruevski told the Charge that he had considered firing Justice Minister Mihajlo Manevski -- by most accounts, a corrupt minister notorious for bullying judges and prosecutors to secure decisions consistent with his own or party interests -- but decided not to so as not to be seen as SKOPJE 00000332 002 OF 004 knuckling under to the opposition SDSM's claim that Manevski double-dipped by receiving both a government pension and salary. Gruevski asserted that the pension issue was merely a systems error that affected about 150 people and amounted to only $400. Additionally, Gruevski told the Charge that he was generally satisfied with the ministers from DUI, his ethnic Albanian partner, and had no plans to seek their ouster (which would have required DUI's consent). He added that the only DUI minister he had concerns about was Environment Minister Nexhati Jakupi, but DUI leader Ali Ahmeti preferred to keep him on. (Subsequently, DUI Minister of Economy Fatmir Besimi told us that he may be forced to resign in the coming weeks over the GoM's handling of EVN, the Austrian electricity distributor which Gruevski seems intent on forcing out of Macedonia.) 6. (C) According to Macedonian law, had Gruevski sought to replace seven or more ministers this would have meant a full change in government and could have caused some political upheaval such as re-negotiating Gruevski's coalition deal with DUI. It would have also meant a delay of up to 40 days to form the new government. As it stands now, the opposition in parliament can only raise concerns about the portfolios of the ministers to be replaced, and the new ministers will be in place as soon as July 10. Economic Slide Continues, No Real GoM Response --------------------------------------------- - 7. (SBU) Dreary economic news continues to flow in. GDP in the first quarter was down 0.9%, with nearly all sectors reporting flat or negative growth. DPM Stavreski tried to spin this performance as a success of GOM policies, noting greater downturns in other countries. He predicted positive GDP growth in the third and fourth quarters, but did not explain the assumptions on which he based this forecast. Indeed, key economic indicators are showing a different picture. Industrial output fell by 11.1% from January to May. The trade deficit for the same period reached $951 million, or 10% of GDP. Exports are down 43.4%, and imports dropped by 32.9%. 8. (SBU) FDI in the first quarter was only $70.7 million, none of which are greenfield investments; most consisted of reinvested profits, re-capitalization, and/or already present foreign investors bringing in more equipment and assets. Net private transfers, which include remittances, were down by 38.6% in the first quarter, thus pushing the current account deficit to $445 million (5% of GDP). Budget revenues from January to May were down over 10%, mostly due to the sharp decline of 25% in VAT collections (VAT accounts for about 40% of total revenues). At the same time, expenditures were up by over 21% as the GOM will apparently not give up unproductive projects. Trying to cover the budget and current account gaps, the GOM just recently sold another Eurobond, collecting 175 million euros at an interest rate of 9.875%. In addition, it continuously borrows domestically by selling denar and forex T-bills with different maturities. Responding to a loosened fiscal policy, monetary policy is very tight, resulting in increasing interest rates. Despite its apparent need to take on an IMF standby agreement to stanch the flow, the GoM seems resolved to take commercial loans to cover its budget obligations, viewing the IMF and its conditionality/scrutiny as a last resort. "Name" and Albanian Woes ------------------------ 9. (C) The heat is also being turned up on the "name issue" and interethnic relations. UN Mediator Nimetz was in Skopje July 6-7, then went to Athens. Gruevski told the Charge July 8 that the visit was positive and progress may be possible, "depending on the Greeks." Meanwhile, the DUI and VMRO leaderships have been locked in what Protoger told us were "serious but positive" negotiations on a raft of DUI demands, ranging from the rights and roles of DUI ministers, GoM spending in predominantly e-Albanian municipalities, the draft law on the Interior Ministry, implementation of the language law, and a host of others. 10. (SBU) Intra-Albanian discord is also on the rise. DPA leader Menduh Thaci formally released his proposal for a new interethnic agreement -- intended to replace the Ohrid Framework Agreement -- on July 6. Thaci has admitted to our EUSR colleagues that this new document is nothing more than a way to score points against DUI, and Thaci may use his proposal as a way to coalesce other smaller e-Albanian parties into his orbit. Among other things, Thaci's "political contract" calls for consensual government decision-making (i.e., the e-Albanian party in government gets a veto), Albanian as an official language, and that one SKOPJE 00000332 003 OF 004 of the three most powerful political offices (Prime Minister, President, Speaker) always be held by an e-Albanian. (More on this issue septel.) DUI "Retakes" University ------------------------ 11. (SBU) DUI made its own power play July 2 when, armed with an order from then Education Minister Stojanovski, its loyalists entered the State University of Tetovo (SUT) and summarily dismissed Acting Rector Agim Vela and the entire university Senate (vice rectors and deans). While they are at pains to claim that this is not the case, DUI's actions are strikingly similar to what DPA did in 2006 when it joined the government, marched in with thugs, and eventually installed its own rector, Sadi Bexheti (who is now DPA's mayor of Tetovo). The university is now quite tense, with "off-duty" police loyal to DUI "maintaining order" and keeping faculty and staff loyal to DPA off the premises. For his part, Bexheti and Vela told us July 8 that they will fight the issue in the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights. 12. (SBU) SUT has always been a troubled institution, including its history as an illegal university beginning in 1994. After it became a state university 10 years later, it has been essentially treated as a fiefdom of whichever e-Albanian party is in government. Most e-Macedonians and many e-Albanians tell us SUT is often chaotic and -- at best -- just another relatively poor public university. DUI's efforts to persuade the public -- and us -- that its actions are legitimate ring hollow. Comment: Icebergs Ahead ----------------------- 13. (C) Gruevski has in the past been reluctant to fire ministers, even poor performers (as most are), but rumors persist that there is increasing unhappiness with the current slate from within VMRO. Even this relatively modest shuffle allows him to distract the public from focusing on issues such as the economy, the name issue, interethnic relations, and criticism of Gruevski for moving too slowly toward Euro-Atlantic integration. As Macedonia continues to drift in the wrong direction on many of these issues, Gruevski,s responses seem too small and too slow as he clings to his preferred positions and approaches. He will need to make bold course changes to meet Macedonia,s major external and internal challenges successfully. End comment. Brief Ministerial Bios ---------------------- 14. (SBU) Valdimir Pesevski, Deputy PM for the Economy: Pesevski was born in 1970, and takes up the DPM slot from his previous position as Director General of SEAF (Small Enterprise Assistance Funds) South Balkan Fund based in Belgrade, Serbia. He has been there since 2005, covering SEAF projects in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Previously, he worked in SEAF Macedonia moving up the ladder to Director's position. He received his BA in Electrical Engineering at the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Skopje in 1993 and then began his career as a Research Assistant in the Macedonian Institute for Energy and Computer Science. In 1995 he moved to the MBRC (Macedonian Business Resource Center), a USAID-funded project, where he worked as a consultant providing general management and financial consulting services to medium and large Macedonian companies. Pesevski joined SEAF-Macedonia's local management team in 1998. He received his MBA (with distinction) from Sheffield University, where he has also been guest lecturer in the Executive MBA program at the campus in Thessaloniki. He also advised the President of Macedonia on economic policies for SMEs following the conflict of 2001 and is an active member of the National Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness Council. He speaks fluent English. 15. (SBU) Vasko Naumovski, DPM for Euro-integration: Naumovski was born in Skopje in 1980, and takes up the DPM slot from his previous position as Assistant Professor at the New York University Skopje. During the 2009 presidential and municipal elections, he was a frequent pro-VMRO-DPMNE television commentator/analyst. He received his BA in International Law at the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Skopje in 2003, and from there he pursued two masters degrees, one in European Studies at the Rheinische-Friedrich-Wilhelms University of Bonn, Germany, and the second in International Law at the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Skopje. He received his Ph.D. in International Law from the same institution in 2008. Prior to his employment at New York University Skopje he was SKOPJE 00000332 004 OF 004 a project analyst for a project on coordination of foreign aid with UNDP and the Ministry of Justice. Naumovski attended a six-week Study of U.S. Institutions (SUSI) program in the U.S. in 2008. He speaks fluent English. 16. (SBU) Ljupco Dimovski, Minister of Agriculture: Dimovski was born in Veles in 1959, and takes up the Agriculture portfolio from his previous position as Deputy Minister of Transport and Communications. He received his BA in international finance and banking at the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Skopje. He began working in 1986 as deputy director at Tehnometal-Vardar AD Skopje, a trading company. In 1998 he became the Director General of Electric Industries Skopje. In 2005 he became the Director General of Parks and Forests Skopje (a public company). Dimovski served as Secretary General of the Socialist Party of Macedonia from 2004 to 2005. He speaks English and Spanish. 17. (SBU) Nikola Todorov, Minister of Education: Todorov was born in 1978 and takes up his position as Minister of Education from his previous position as head of the Skopje Cadastre (land registry) office. In recent years the cadastre office, with funding from the World Bank, undertook major customer-service reforms and moved to a modern new facility, making it one of the best-run cadastres in the region, according to World Bank sources. Todorov was advisor to the former director of Public Enterprise for Management of Residential and Commercial Properties of the Republic of Macedonia. He is the son of Stojan Todorov, who recently resigned as Secretary-General of the Government. He has a law degree; English-language ability unknown. NAVRATIL
