[05SOFIA1796] PROGRESS ON U.S. MILITARY ACCESS, BUT TOUGH ISSUES REMAIN

0
Published by Wikileaks & Bivol.bg
 date: 10/17/2005 14:11 refid: 05SOFIA1796 origin: Embassy Sofia classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 05SOFIA924 header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.   C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001796    SIPDIS    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015  TAGS: MARR, PGOV, PREL, BU  SUBJECT: PROGRESS ON U.S. MILITARY ACCESS, BUT TOUGH ISSUES  REMAIN    REF: SOFIA 0924    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jeffrey D. Levine, for reasons 1.4 a a  nd d.    1. (C) SUMMARY:  A negotiating team led by Ambassador Robert  Loftis made significant progress toward concluding a  supplemental Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the GOB  during talks in Sofia October 6-7.  Significant work remains  to be done, however, in the areas of freedom of movement and  criminal jurisdiction, both of which are of prime importance  to the United States.  Following up on the team's first visit  to Sofia May 16-17 (reftel), U.S. and Bulgarian negotiators  discussed a revised U.S. supplemental SOFA proposal, proposed  GOB revisions to the supplemental, and the GOB's  significantly revised draft of the Defense Cooperation  Agreement (DCA).  The GOB initially indicated its desire to  include in the DCA language covering a much larger sphere of  security cooperation than that envisioned by the U.S., but  agreed to set the treatment of these issues aside for the  moment.  Press coverage of the talks was uncharacteristically  negative, indicating that opponents -- perhaps including  third countries -- seek an opportunity to derail them.  END  SUMMARY.    2. (C) The leader of the Bulgarian negotiating team,  Ambassador Lubomir Ivanov, told Amb. Loftis that the GOB  wished to discuss a wide range of topics in addition to the  supplemental Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Defense  Cooperation Agreement (DCA), including cooperative research  and development, expanded relations between scientific and  technical communities, and a framework for political-military  consultations.  He noted that in drafting their versions of  the DCA and Supplemental SOFA they had relied on other  agreements that the USG had entered into with other NATO  allies (e.g., Turkey and Spain).  Amb. Loftis explained that  such topics are outside his mandate, which is limited to  status and access issues.  Ivanov agreed to negotiate those  items within Amb. Loftis' mandate with the understanding that  discussions on the broader issues are necessary because "we  have to be politically able to explain the full range of  activities covered by our cooperation."    3. (C) After a long interlude necessitated by the Bulgarian  elections in June and a two-month delay in forming a new  ruling coalition, SOFA/DCA negotiations resumed October 6 and  7.  Over the course of two days of detailed negotiations, the  delegations made substantial progress on language in the SOFA  and discussed generally the Defense Cooperation Agreement.  The Bulgarians largely agreed to the U.S. positions on  taxation and import/export.  They also moved toward the U.S.  position on environmental protections and the status of  contractors. A number of challenges remain in the following  areas:    a. Criminal Jurisdiction: The GOB does not want to give the  impression that it is surrendering sovereignty.  Ivanov said  that the standard U.S. language would be a "problem of  presentation" and would be difficult to explain to the  public, a majority of whom would oppose the perceived limits  on Bulgarian sovereignty.  Specifically, the Bulgarians do  not want to grant an advance waiver of criminal jurisdiction,  which is a standard provision in our bilateral Supplemental  SOFAs with NATO allies.  Instead, the Bulgarians proposed  language indicating that upon request by the U.S. military,  it would waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction  except in cases of particular importance and that such a  request for waiver would be considered granted if the MOJ had  not notified the U.S. military of its granting of the request  or requested clarification in 30 days of receipt of the  waiver request.    b. Freedom of Movement: In their draft of the DCA, the  Bulgarians limited use of facilities to training and  exercises and military operations under the NATO umbrella and  required prior notification. For activities outside of the  NATO framework, the use of facilities would be subject to  prior authorization by the competent Bulgarian authorities.  Their draft also proposed a limit on the number of U.S.  personnel who could be "stationed" in Bulgaria.  Amb. Loftis  explained that language addressing deployments was a critical  issue and stressed the need for maximum flexibility for any  U.S. forces in Bulgaria.    4. (C) In the days leading up to the U.S. delegation's  arrival, the Bulgarian media ran news reports claiming that  the U.S. wanted to establish large "military zones" around  the commercial port of Burgas that would severely limit  commercial shipping activity.  This prompted three members of  Parliament from Burgas to send a letter of inquiry to the  MFA.  In response to Amb Ivanov's request for clarification,  we assured him that the U.S. was only interested in  periodically shipping military cargo through Burgas'  commercial port and we had no plans to establish a naval base  there.    5. (C) After the end of formal negotiations, Ambassador  Loftis and DCM Levine met privately with Ambassador Ivanov to  discuss the way forward.  Amb. Loftis stressed again the  importance of freedom of movement and criminal jurisdiction  to the success of the negotiations.  He also cautioned Amb.  Ivanov against continuing to cite old bilateral agreements  between the U.S. and other NATO countries, noting that they  were designed for situations in which the U.S. had stationed  large numbers of troops and were at any rate not well suited  to the current strategic situation.  Amb. Ivanvov reiterated  that Bulgaria wants to conclude the agreements and improve  its cooperation with the U.S., but also that he is under  instructions to both protect Bulgaria's sovereignty and to  widen the cooperation with the U.S. as far as possible.    6. (C) On October 7, Amb. Loftis briefed a joint meeting of  senior members of Parliament's defense and foreign affairs  committees.  Without getting into the details of the  negotiations, Amb. Loftis gave the parliamentarians a brief  description of the Global Defense Posture Realignment and how  it relates to Bulgaria, stressing that the U.S. is seeking  access to Bulgarian facilities and has no desire to establish  its own military bases in Bulgaria.  The committee's  leadership asked about industrial cooperation, strategic  consultations, and financial arrangements.  Amb. Loftis  responded that his mandate is to negotiate status and access  agreements, but the USG might be willing to separately  consider these and other questions outside the scope of the  two agreements.  He said that the U.S. pays its own way but  does not pay rent for access to bases, and that freedom of  movement is a key U.S. consideration.  The parliamentary  reaction was generally positive, but the  leader of the  extreme nationalist Ataka party, Volen Siderov, took the  opportunity to grandstand, saying that the U.S. military  presence would expose Bulgaria to attack and calling for a  referendum on the proposed agreements.    7. (C) Press coverage of the Loftis visit was more negative  than expected.  While the body of most articles was more or  less factually correct, headlines in the two largest dailies  focused on the fact that the U.S. would not pay for the use  of Bulgarian facilities and would not ask permission to  launch military strikes from Bulgarian territory (sic).  Some  of our Bulgarian contacts have suggested that the Russian  embassy in Sofia may be encouraging Ataka and influencing  press coverage of the issue.  The ground for such measures is  undeniably fertile; a tracking poll commissioned by the  Embassy in September showed that 61 percent of Bulgarians  oppose "U.S. bases" on their territory.    8. (C) COMMENT:  With a new government having taken power  since the last negotiating session in May, the Bulgarian side  started these talks almost from zero.  The talks, however,  proceeded in a businesslike manner and resulted in  substantial progress on many articles of the SOFA  Supplemental.  Ivanov and others in the government have also  stressed their determination to reach agreement.  Siderov's  outburst and the negative press spin highlight the need for  sustained public diplomacy on our part, and even more so on  the part of the Bulgarian government.  We are working on a  public outreach plan (op-eds, interviews, visits to regions  where military bases to which we would like access are  located) to counter the disinformation, and will press the  government to develop its own public-education campaign as  well.  In particular, it will be critical to dispel public  misperceptions, fueled at times by the government's own  comments, that the U.S. intends to establish large military  bases in Bulgaria. END COMMENT.    9. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Robert  Loftis.  LEVINE 
Share.

About Author

Leave A Reply