Published by Wikileaks & Bivol.bg
date: 12/30/2005 10:31 refid: 05SOFIA2123 origin: Embassy Sofia classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 05SOFIA2025 header: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 002123 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR AND PM - AMBASSADOR LOFTIS OSD FOR PETE NAJERA AND LESLEY YOUNG E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2015 TAGS: MARR, PGOV, PREL, KPAO, BU, RU SUBJECT: BULGARIA: BASING PROSPECTS ON TRACK DESPITE PUBLIC SKEPTICISM REF: SOFIA 2025 Classified By: CDA Jeffrey Levine for reasons 1.4 (a) and (d). 1.(C) SUMMARY. The government of Bulgaria remains committed to concluding a shared basing agreement with the U.S. despite widespread public opposition. As previous Bulgarian governments have done on issues such as Iraq and Kosovo, this government is prepared to lead public opinion rather than follow. The extreme nationalist Ataka party, with suspected Russian advice and assistance, has negatively influenced press coverage of the negotiations, but its calls for a referendum have failed to gain traction. Given the relative dearth of anti-American sentiment in Bulgaria, we believe the best antidote to public skepticism is the rapid conclusion of an agreement. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) According to recent U.S.-sponsored public opinion data, 69 percent of Bulgarians disapprove of the U.S. military using military bases in Bezmer and Novo Selo. However, on December 8, two days after Secretary Rice signed a basing agreement with Romania, the MFA's official spokesman, Dimitar Tsanchev, issued the following announcement: "Negotiations on the deployment of joint Bulgarian-U.S. military installations continue, and at this stage there are no serious problems hindering the talks. An agreement is expected to be reached in the near future taking into consideration the countries' common interests." On December 27, an MFA official privately confirmed that we are "very close to an agreement on the Status of Forces package." 3. (C) The willingness of Bulgaria's political leadership to move ahead in the face of public opposition is a phenomenon we have observed before. In 1999, there was widespread and vocal public opposition to the Kostov government's decision to grant blanket overflight clearance to U.S. aircraft engaged in military operations against neighboring Yugoslavia. In 2003, Parliament approved the deployment of an infantry battalion to Iraq despite polls showing that only eight percent of Bulgarians fully supported participation. Even more telling was the GOB's determination to continue its participation in the coalition for two years despite suffering 13 killed and 80 wounded. The Socialist-led government elected last summer continues to buck public opinion, first by reneging on its pledge to immediately withdraw the infantry battalion from Iraq and then by all-but-officially accepting the follow-on mission favored by the U.S. military. We expect a formal decision on the Iraq follow-on mission as soon as CENTCOM and the Bulgarian military agree on the technical terms of reference. 4. (C) The extreme nationalist party Ataka is a leading critic of the basing negotiations (reftel). Although Ataka has not had a significant impact to date, its hard-line stance puts pressure on the Bulgarian Socialist Party, whose core electorate shares many of the same views on foreign policy. Ataka's calls for a national referendum on the basing agreements have failed to gain traction, and it remains on the fringes of the political scene. However, there are indications that the Russian embassy in Sofia may be supporting Ataka and encouraging negative press coverage of the basing issue. The Russian CHOD also received substantial local press coverage in early December when he raised the prospect of U.S. missile defenses in Bulgaria (sic) and said, "God forbid if downed foreign missiles fell on the Kozloduy nuclear power plant" in Bulgaria. Baluevski also reportedly said he was "astounded" that the U.S. was not going to pay rent for the use of Bulgarian bases since this was "the normal practice around the world." 5. (C) COMMENT: While the GOB has a track record of taking controversial foreign policy decisions in the face of public opposition, the negative poll numbers highlight the need for a sustained public diplomacy effort on our part. In November, during the last bilateral negotiating session, we arranged television and print interviews with the lead U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Robert Loftis. Perhaps more importantly, we successfully urged a number of Bulgarian opinion leaders from the Left side of the political spectrum -- where opposition is most concentrated -- to speak out in support of the basing agreements. Our Public Affairs section has commissioned a reputable polling agency to conduct focus groups to pinpoint Bulgarians' specific concerns. And in an effort to reach a wider audience, we are facilitating a visit by a Bulgarian television crew to a U.S. military base in Western Europe to show the Bulgarian public what a U.S. military presence looks like and how the local population interacts with American service members. Our most effective means of countering Ataka and its sponsors, however, will be the presence of U.S. boots on the ground in Bulgaria. Given the absence of strong underlying anti-American sentiment, we believe public attitudes will change once the agreements are signed and our troops begin deploying here. LEVINE
