[08SOFIA229] INTERIOR MINISTER RESIGNS UNDER MOUNTING PRESSURE

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Published by Wikileaks & Bivol.bg
 date: 4/15/2008 14:25 refid: 08SOFIA229 origin: Embassy Sofia classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN destination: 08SOFIA192 header: VZCZCXYZ0023 PP RUEHWEB  DE RUEHSF #0229/01 1061425 ZNY CCCCC ZZH(CCY ADDED ADDEES AD0080B934/MSI6780 510) P 151425Z APR 08 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4930 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUCNFB/DIR FBI WASHDC RUEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC   C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000229    SIPDIS    SENSITIVE  SIPDIS    C O R R E C T E D  COPY (ADDEES ADDED ONLY)  E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018  TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KCRM, KCOR, BU  SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER RESIGNS UNDER MOUNTING PRESSURE    REF: SOFIA 0192    Classified By: ambassador Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).    1.  (C)  SUMMARY: PM Stanishev forced Interior Minister  Petkov,s hand into a resignation after two weeks of a  deepening scandal that had trashed Bulgaria,s international  image and fed domestic cynicism over government collusion  with criminals.  Intense international pressure made the  difference in Stanishev,s calculations, but the Bulgarian  media also showed some welcome teeth in taking on a  dangerously powerful figure.  The Prime Minister emerges as a  net winner, patiently outlasting hardline Socialist party  stalwarts protecting Petkov.  He has promised a thorough  shakeup of the cabinet, and overhaul of a clearly  dysfunctional ministry.  The intelligence service (DANS) that  the PM fought to establish as independent of MOI saw its  first "internal" action, and was generally praised.  President Parvanov comes out looking weak, in first  supporting and ultimately abandoning a longtime confidante  and protege.  The Socialists, coalition partner NMSS  exploited the scandal to force action against its own cabinet  ministers who have run afoul of ex-PM King Simeon.  The Prime  Minister now has a brief window to try to rebuild some public  confidence in government integrity, and to lead real reform  of the deeply corrupt Interior Ministry.  To that end, the  PM,s National Security advisor has requested consultation  and advice from U.S. experts.  We should move fast to say  yes. END SUMMARY    EXTERNAL REALITY-CHECK  ----------------------    2.  (C)  Interior Minister Petkov battled for two weeks  against an ever more damaging scandal regarding his  leadership.  He sought out the U.S., UK and Dutch ambassadors  in an effort to defend himself, but our blunt, private answer  (ref A) was that he had to go for the good of the country.  The EU steadily reinforced that message with harsh public  warnings and private pressure.  A PM adviser told us  Stanishev received at least two phone calls from Brussels  threatening to invoke the safeguard clause against Bulgaria  if Petkov were not removed.  According to another insider,  such a harsh sanction -- enough to topple the government --  gave Stanishev the necessary leverage within his Bulgarian  Socialist Party to remove Petkov.  The end, in the end, came  more quickly than even the PM,s closest advisors predicted.      GROWING DOMESTIC PRESSURE  -------------------------    3.  (C)  With at least two investigations opened by  prosecutors against Petkov, and his other MOI allies arrested  or close to it, the embattled Interior Minister found himself  under unceasing domestic assault.  While key BSP figures and  even President Parvanov initially rallied to his defense,  they backed away as more revelations came to light.  Pressure  mounted when Petkov's own 50-page report, which the BSP hoped  would defuse the crisis, depicted a corrupt and paralyzed law  enforcement system.  Parliament's Domestic Security Committee  issued a brutal report April 10, criticizing the MOI's  failure to investigate crimes due to the leak of information  to suspects and lack of cooperation with other law  enforcement agencies.  Based on data from the newly  established State Agency for National Security (DANS) and  hearings of ex-MOI officials, the report concluded that drug  seizures had fallen after Interior Ministry officials passed  classified information to crime groups trading in synthetic  drugs, profits from which were partly used to fund terrorist  organizations.    4.  (C)  Most damaging of all was the weekly journal  Kapital's April 11 publication of a leaked confidential  transcript of the Domestic Security Committee's hearing.  The  transcript exposed a ministry in chaos and helpless in  dealing with organized crime groups supported from high  government levels.  The most shocking revelation was the  admission of Gen. Vanyu Tanov, the former chief of the MOI  organized crime unit GDBOP, that every single GDBOP operation  over the past two years had been compromised due to leaked  information.  Tanov told the Committee that every operation  against the gray economy revealed the involvement of  politicians, MPs, government officials, employees of the  customs office or tax authorities.  As if to underscore the  extent of the ministry's incompetence, last week four more  prominent execution-style killings took place in Bulgaria,  further raising public tension.  A poll released just before  Petkov,s resignation indicated that 59 percent of Bulgarians  wanted Petkov to resign, with 44 percent believing he was    personally involved in criminal activities.    PRESSURE FROM PARTNERS - MORE CABINET CHANGES?  --------------------------------------------- -    5.  (SBU)  Early in the scandal junior coalition partner NMSS  called publicly on Petkov to step down, the most vocal public  disagreement between the NMSS and BSP since the coalition was  formed.  Though the government predictably won a  no-confidence vote on April 11, NMSS parliamentarians  abstained rather than vote to support their own coalition.  Deputy PM Vulchev from NMSS told the Ambassador the  abstention was aimed at signaling unhappiness with Petkov,  but that was not the whole story: ex-king and NMSS leader  Simeon used the tactic to press the PM to make a wider  government reshuffle that would also replace NMSS ministers  who had dissented against him, including Deputy Prime  Minister Vulchev, Defense Minister Bliznakov, and State  Administration Minister Vassilev.  The PM announced he would  begin discussions on cabinet changes with the coalition  partners this week.    COMMENT  -------    6.  (C)  Bulgarians reacted with relief to Petkov's removal.  While clear U.S. messages and a sharp EU threat were likely  decisive, the government also faced domestic and media  pressure to clean house.  Still, Petkov's resilience, even  likely survival as an MP and BSP administrator, shows the  depth and breadth of corruption within the government and  BSP.    7.  (C)  Stanishev is a clear winner, though he would have  looked even stronger had he acted earlier.  He had long  wanted to reduce Petkov's influence, much of which was based  on his MOI position and access to "kompromat."  Stanishev's  creation of DANS was clearly aimed at weakening Petkov by  stripping him of a key investigatory tool.  President  Parvanov, Stanishev's rival for party influence, has suffered  embarrassment for his early and strong public support for his  ally Petkov.    8.  (C)  The coming months will test Stanishev's ability to  remake the BSP and the coalition.  Choosing a technocrat to  succeed Petkov would indicate Stanishev's strength and  resolve and would be a hopeful sign for real reform.  A  replacement chosen from the BSP old guard would indicate that  the party accepted Petkov's removal only as a face-saving  gesture and the MOI will return to business as usual.  As for  the NMSS, Stanishev will likely strike a bargain over the  cabinet positions.  Bulgaria has a weak bench as it is, and  with barely 14 months until the next general election, the PM  will need to drive any reform vigorously.  Stanishev-Parvanov  tensions can only grow sharper, and will bear watching for  the future of the BSP as the PM looks to his political future  and the President to his legacy.    9.  (C)  Even as Stanishev looks to revamp the cabinet, he  must also overhaul the MOI to restore public trust, rebuild  law enforcement capacity and shore up morale.  It,s a  massive job.  New legislation was already planned to account  for different responsibilities and authorities since DANS was  created.  A key Stanishev advisor has reached out to us  seeking input from U.S. experts as the PM tries to build a  new structure for the Interior Ministry that is effective,  modern, and above suspicion.  We should seize this offer,  which represents a strong signal from the Prime Minister of  his commitment to an even closer U.S.-Bulgarian relationship.   We doubt he,s made the same request to the Russians.   END  COMMENT.      Beyrle 
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