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date: 2/4/2010 14:52 refid: 10SKOPJE52 origin: Embassy Skopje classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: VZCZCXRO6235 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHSQ #0052/01 0351452 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041452Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8862 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0593 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC ----------------- header ends ---------------- C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000052 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, MK SUBJECT: MACEDONIA:DUI LEADER AHMETI ON ISSUES STRAINING THE COALITION AND NAME ISSUE RESOLUTION Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP REEKER FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) and (d). 1. (C) SUMMARY: Lack of progress on the &name issue8 and ongoing divisive interethnic relations are straining the coalition, DUI leader Ali Ahmeti told the Ambassador in meetings on January 19 and 20. Ahmeti said Gruevski,s relentless emphasis on the Macedonian identity was hurting DUI, as ethnic-Albanians are increasingly disenchanted with DUI,s continued presence in coalition with Gruevski. While Ahmeti is clearly frustrated, he has no plans to leave the government. Ahmeti reports that his first meeting with President Ivanov was generally positive and pragmatic. (End Summary) ---------------------------------------- DUI FRUSTRATED AND WEAKEND BY NAME ISSUE ---------------------------------------- 2. (C) Ambassador met with DUI leader Ali Ahmeti and his chief lieutenant, Deputy Prime Minister Abdulaqim Ademi, on January 19 (in Tetovo) and 20 (at the CMR). Ahmeti stated that while the resolution of the name issue remains critically important to the e-Albanian community, he was in a difficult position. Ahmeti noted that Gruevski had bombarded the ethnic-Macedonians with propaganda regarding identity and culture and as a result was maintaining strong public approval (recent IRI polling shows strong but slipping support for the PM and his party). Conversely, DUI,s support level had taken a severe hit (down four percentage points from twelve to eight percent in last six months), which Ahmeti claims is due to his inability to put more pressure on the PM to solve the name issue. Ambassador Reeker explained to Ahmeti that there was an increasing concern in the international community that Macedonia was not genuinely committed to resolving the name issue and both Macedonia and Greece needed to take tangible steps forward over the next six months. Ahmeti agreed that this period is critical and insisted that he was putting pressure on Gruevski. However, he seemed uncertain how DUI could change its strategy on the name issue and declined to set a date at which point his party would pull out of the coalition if no progress was made. Ahmeti said leaving the coalition would only hurt the country and wanted to avoid such a step. 3. (C) Ahmeti told the Ambassador that in Ahmeti's January 20 meeting with Gruevski, the Prime Minister spent much of their session lamenting the amount of pressure Ahmeti was putting on him to resolve the name issue. In turn, Ahmeti told Gruevski that the opinion polls wanted him to apply even more pressure. Ahmeti asked the Ambassador for several clarifications on various aspects of the name issue that Gruevski had conveyed to them. Gruevski reportedly told Ahmeti that Greece was insisting that identity and language be included in the negotiations, that changing the country,s name in the passport would require changing the constitution, and activity in the negotiations process could only logically resume following the Greek presidential elections. The Ambassador said that we did not believe these assertions to be accurate. 4. (C) Ahmeti noted that he was concerned that opposition party leader Crvenkovski,s political tactics were only hindering Gruevski,s ability to resolve the name issue. He felt Crvenkovski had created a no-win political scenario for Gruevski, in which if Gruevski did not solve the name issue he would be jeopardizing the future of the country and if he did solve it he would be selling out Macedonia,s identity. Ahmeti claimed the rift between Crvenkovski,s SDSM and Gruevski,s VMRO was much deeper than those among the e-Albanian parties. Ahmeti believed that if the e-Albanian parties were presented with an opportunity to unite to resolve the name issue they could temporarily overcome their differences, but such unity was impossible for SDSM and VMRO. Because of that, Ahmeti did not believe a "Government of Unity" was a likely option for dealing with the "name" issue. --------------------------------------------- ----- ETHNICALLY DIVISIVE ISSUES STRAINING THE COALITION --------------------------------------------- ----- 5. (C) Ahmeti cited several ethnically divisive issues he felt were straining coalition ties and making it more difficult for the country to focus on the name issue. He said that the most divisive currently is the proposed laws on changing primary and secondary school registrars in e-Albanian communities from the Albanian language to the Macedonian language and the GoM,s push to make Macedonian language classes obligatory at the first grade level (currently Macedonian becomes obligatory at fourth grade in SKOPJE 00000052 002 OF 002 minority communities). He said these laws provoked particularly strong reactions from the e-Albanian public because they evoked memories of Macedonia,s Yugoslav past and incited inflammatory rhetoric from both sides (e.g.- &This is not Albania! Go to Albania if you want to learn Albanian!8). He also called the planned construction of an Orthodox church in Skopje,s central square (along with the ceaseless construction of churches and mosques throughout Macedonia) &sinful8 given the condition of the rest of the country. He noted, however, that he could not publicly condemn the church or he would be branded an intolerant Muslim. Ahmeti said the continued processing of the 2001 cases returned to Macedonia from the ICTY and the GoM,s refusal to address the irregularities presented by a special parliamentary group surrounding the convictions of 12 e-Albanians in the Sopot case were also putting a strain on coalition relations. Ahmeti wants to see the returned cases resolved and does not want them to be a frozen issue that VMRO reopens every time they need to put pressure on him. Ahmeti said that VMRO tried to negotiate a compromise in which parliament would accept the findings on the Sopot case if DUI stopped blocking the proposed laws on education. Ahmeti said finding justice was too important and he would not make a deal. 6. (C) Ahmeti said he laid out all of these issues for Gruevski at their January 20 meeting and that Gruevski agreed that the coalition was not functioning well. Ahmeti said Gruevski seemed displeased with DUI,s lack of support for the laws on education and was also unhappy with statements cming from DUI MPs on other issues. Ahmeti told Gruevski that the media was manipulating these statements and they both needed to do a better job controlling their party people. Ultimately, Ahmeti and Gruevski decided that DPM Ademi and PM CoS Martin Protoger would sit down and work out an agreement on all the issues laid out in the meeting. That meeting took place on January 25, and while they did not come to terms on resolving any of the aforementioned issues, both agreed that communication between DUI and VMRO needed to improve. To broaden inter-party communication and cooperation they decided to organize a couple of meetings that will include five or six of each party's senior leaders to discuss possible solutions. 7. (C) Ahmeti pleaded with the Ambassador for U.S. assistance in resolving these issues. Ambassador explained that issues such as the use of language in schools should not be a central concern for the international community; Macedonia needed to demonstrate its maturity as a nation and resolve those issues through constructive, rational dialogue. Ambassador agreed that the GoM,s plans to construct the new Orthodox church in Skopje were disturbing given the country,s more pressing needs, and that such resource allocation priorities ultimately damaged the GoM,s credibility when seeking international assistance for development projects. The Ambassador said he would continue to convey this point to the PM and encouraged Ahmeti to do so as well. --------------------------------------------- ------------- FIRST PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN AHMETI AND PRESIDENT IVANOV --------------------------------------------- ------------- 8. (C) Ahmeti reported that his first private meeting with President Ivanov on December 30 went well even if it was long overdue. The discussion focused on adding two e-Albanian members to Ivanov,s staff and the name issue. Ivanov agreed with Ahmeti that negotiations with Greece to resolve the name issue must remain a top priority. Later on the evening of January 20, Ahmeti and his wife joined the Ambassador for a philharmonic concert (unprecedented for Ahmeti). President and Mrs. Ivanov were also the Ambassador's guests and it was the first time the two leaders' spouses met. REEKER
